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THE NEXT STEP: DEFINITION, 
GENERALIZATION, AND THEORY 
IN AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 
Carl E. Schneider* 
The way to gain a liberal view of your subject is . . . to 
get to the bottom of the subject itself. The means of do-
ing that are, in the first place, to follow the existing 
body of dogma into its highest generalizations by the 
help of jurisprudence; next, to discover from history how 
it has come to be what it is; and, finally, so far as you 
can, to consider the ends which the several rules seek to 
accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, 
what is given up to gain them, and whether they are 
worth the price.** 
Oliver Wendell Holmes 
The Path of the Law 
The Journal of Law Reform's Symposium on Family Law 
comes opportunely, in legal scholarship's spring of hope, its win-
ter of despair, at a time when we have everything before us, 
when we have nothing before us. As is natural in such an epoch, 
reflection about legal scholarship, about its history, purposes, 
and methods, has flourished. 1 This Symposium invites us to ex-
tend that reflection to family law, and this essay attempts, ten-
tatively and speculatively, to accept the invitation. 
Several areas of legal scholarship-torts, contracts, criminal 
law, first amendment law, antitrust, and tax come readily to 
mind-have found a kind of maturity as scholarly disciplines by 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A., 1972, Harvard Univer-
sity; J.D., 1979, University of Michigan. I wish to thank a number of generous people for 
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay: David L. Chambers, Edward H. 
Cooper, Richard 0. Lempert, Joseph L. Sax, Frederick F. Schauer, Joan W. Schneider, 
Dorothy Schneider, Lee E. Teitelbaum, and Maris A. Vinovskis. 
** 10 HARV, L. REV. 457, 476 (1897). 
l. See, e.g., Symposium, American Legal Scholarship: Directions and Dilemmas, 33 
J. LEGAL Eouc. 403 (1983); Symposium, Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes, 90 
YALE L.J. 955 (1981). 
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working to define their fields, to generalize about their subjects, 
and to develop theories to explain their subjects. Tort law, to 
take a convenient instance, benefitted a century ago from at-
tempts to define its scope,2 progressed even in an atheoretical 
period through the generalizing work of treatise writers,3 and 
has lately seen theory (often interdisciplinary) which has pro-
duced "a striking renaissance of creative scholarship in Torts. "4 
Probably in consequence, academic influence on tort law has 
been "regular and profound, shaping basic conceptions of civil 
liability."11 
Although family-law scholarship has had admirable successes, 
it has not, as I try to show in the first part of this essay, reached 
the maturity represented by definition, generalization, and the-
ory. In the second part of the essay, I suggest that family law 
has met several obstacles to maturity, some of them common to 
legal scholarship, some of them inherent in family-law scholar-
ship. In the third part, I argue that some of these obstacles have 
lost their power to obstruct, and that the advantages of syn-
thetic work beckon us on. I close the essay by proposing some 
approaches to generalization that I hope may be fruitful. 
I. 
It is, I think, commonly and correctly assumed that the litera-
ture of family law has not systematically defined the discipline 
called "family law." The hornbook in the field6 escapes the issue: 
it addresses the "law of domestic relations" and was written in 
1968, before many of the developments which complicated the 
law of "domestic relations." Family law casebooks no doubt re-
solve the definitional problem implicitly, but the packrat tech-
nique of casebooks obscures the definitional views of the au-
thors, and (understandably, perhaps appropriately) no casebook 
undertakes the discussion that a problem of such complexity 
demands. 
2. G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3-62 (1980). 
3. "In searching for the sources of Prosser's influence as a Torts theoretician one 
recurrently comes upon his capacity to synthesize; his persistence in maintaining classifi-
cations so that they hardened into doctrine; his skill in preserving doctrine he had 
helped create." Id. at 176. 
4. Id. at 179. 
5. Id. at 242. 
6. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1968). 
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Similarly, family-law literature has rarely attempted large-
scale generalization. By "to generalize," I mean no more than to 
identify the common elements and themes in different parts of 
family law. Traditional legal writing relies on the treatise for 
doctrinal generalizations, but family law has not had a multi-
volume treatise for half a century,7 nor a hornbook for twenty 
years, 8 and neither that treatise nor that horn book sought to 
give family law the organizing viewpoint Professor Corbin, for 
example, gave contracts or Professor Tribe offers constitutional 
law. Although the casebook format is ill-suited to systematic and 
articulate generalization, the Goldstein and Katz family-law 
casebook9 breaks the rule against generalization in family law, 
for it works steadily through the psychological components of 
family-law problems. Finally, the law-review articles of family-
law scholars, wise and helpful though they otherwise can be, 
likewise confine themselves to specific, often greatly specific, 
subjects. Of course such articles are necessary and valuable, in 
part precisely because they can be apt ways of exploring broader 
topics; but the striking fact about family-law scholarship is the 
rarity of attempts to go beyond the specific. 
"Theory" has painfully numerous connotations; here I mean 
by it no more than systematic explanation at some level of ab-
straction of how law acts or of why it should act in a particular 
way. Free-speech theory, for example, in some of its forms ex-
plains how free speech promotes wiser government and why free 
speech is morally and socially desirable apart from that conse-
quence. While much theory used in law is borrowed from the 
social sciences, family-law theory, to be useful, need not meet 
standards of scientific (or even social scientific) rigor. Loosely as 
I define "theory," however, there is hardly any in family law. 
Two rare examples are recent, and may foretell a trend. They 
are Mary Ann Glendon's book The New Family and the New 
Property (1981), which describes and attempts to explain the di-
rection of family law in industrialized western societies in histor-
ical and sociological terms, and Frances Olsen's article The 
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Form, 10 
which tries to analyze American family law from a "critical legal 
studies" perspective. 
7. 1-4 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1931-1936). 
8. H. CLARK, supra note 6. 
9. J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW: PROBLEMS FOR DECISION IN THE 
FAMILY LAW PROCESS (1965). 
10. 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
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II. 
Before discussing family law's future, we need to ask what has 
inhibited family law from defining its scope, generalizing about 
its characteristics, and theorizing about its purposes and opera-
tion. Some of the causes are general to American law. The legal 
realists' attack on "conceptualists" and "formalists" still stirs 
distrust of abstraction and theory. The realists themselves were 
prepared to see law explained in social terms, but theory of that 
kind has been hampered by the failure of the social sciences to 
achieve the explanatory power the realists had anticipated. The 
realist's ultimate legacy, Professor Ackerman suggests, was that 
lawyers learned to 
look upon organizing abstractions-be they 'contract' or 
'the public convenience and necessity'-with deep skepti-
cism. The life of the law was to be found in the sensitive 
formation of highly particularistic rules, and in the Real-
istic refusal to generalize those rules beyond the particu-
lar contexts that gave them meaning. 11 
The post-realist "law, science, and policy" approach never found 
influence to match the ambition of its conceptually oriented 
work,12 and much of the work of the legal-process school "was 
geared primarily to problem solving."13 A more general reason 
for the particularism of family law scholarship may lie in the 
pragmatic, anti-ideological attitude often said to be part of the 
American character and typical of American legal scholarship. 
An ideology provides a set of organizing principles through 
which to understand a body of law. Thus some of the first theo-
rizing in the least theoretized areas of law has come from adher-
ents to one of the critical legal studies views.14 
Whatever intellectual fashions predominate, lawyers must al-
ways solve problems, and, as Professor Kuhn suggests, academ-
ics also have to and like to solve puzzles.16 Legal academics will 
11. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 18-19 (1984). 
12. "There is much to be said-both pro and con-about the extraordinary reconcep-
tualization of legal discourse advanced by Harold Lasswell and Myres MacDougal .... 
The important point here, however, was the profession's refusal to engage in the argu-
ment." Id. at 40-41. 
13. R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 
1980s, at 271 (1983). 
14. E.g., J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); Olsen, 
supra note 10. · 
15. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 35-38 (1970) (emphasis in 
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always be pressed to work on the puzzles troubling practitioners, 
judges, and legislators, and family law is specially susceptible to 
such pressure: on one hand, much of the family law met in prac-
tice is of little theoretical interest, since it involves technicalities 
or questions resolved through negotiation. On the other hand, 
the immediate problems of identifiable classes of peo-
ple-abused spouses, children in foster homes-press so cruelly 
that research not directed toward their immediate consolation 
seems almost decadent. It is crucial to recognize that a strength, 
and the continuing-although incomplete-usefulness of tradi-
tional legal scholarship lies in its power to direct concentrated 
attention to the doctrinal analysis of these issues. 16 Partly be-
cause of that strength, family-law scholarship can claim some 
credit for the fact that family law today is impressively different 
from that of twenty years ago,17 and different often in ways that 
make people's lives less painful. 18 
Other general features of legal work and legal scholarship have 
directed work toward the specific. The traditional forms of legal 
expression have proved unconducive to generalization and the-
ory. Lawyers' briefs and judges' opinions speak to issues in a 
particular case, and incremental, precedent-bound adjudication 
deters (though it does not prevent) sweeps of generalization and 
theory. The academic lawyer's paradigmatic form of expression, 
the doctrinal law-review article, has worked so successfully in 
what it does well that it has traditionally not been extended to 
other purposes. And lengthy as law-review articles can be, they 
original): 
Perhaps the most striking feature of ... normal research problems ... is how 
little they aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal . . . . The 
scientific enterprise as a whole does from time to time prove useful, open up new 
territory, display order, and test long-accepted belief. Nevertheless, the individ-
ual engaged on a normal research problem is almost never doing any one of 
these things. . . . What then challenges him is the conviction that, if only he is 
skillful enough, he will succeed in solving a puzzle that no one before has solved 
or solved so well. 
16. Traditional legal scholarship is in some ways akin to and in some ways shares the 
virtues of the "normal science" whose utility Professor Kuhn praises. Normal science is 
non-revolutionary science that seeks to refine and amplify an accepted paradigm rather 
than to invent a new one. Professor Kuhn suggests that by "focussing attention upon a 
small range of relatively esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scientists to investigate 
some part of nature in a detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable." Id. at 
24. 
17. Consider the reforms in the law of divorce, marital property, alimony, child cus-
tody, and abortion, to name only a few of the major areas which have changed in the last 
two decades. 
18. See Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive 
Neutrality, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805, 805-06 (1985). 
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do not provide the book-length space some other disciplines em-
ploy for their more ambitious efforts. 19 Not only have customs of 
legal writing slowed the maturation of legal academic fields; so 
also have the methods of training law professors. They have no 
education in the law beyond that given every lawyer, and that 
education conceals the schools and traditions of legal scholar-
ship. They take no comprehensive exams, they are supervised 
through no theses. 
All this notwithstanding, other fields of law have achieved 
sharper self-definition, broader generalizations, and deeper the-
ory. Does family law differ systematically from fields like torts, 
contracts, criminal law, first amendment law, antitrust law, and 
tax law in ways that impede its progress? To answer this ques-
tion, we will contrast these "maturer" fields with family law, 
first, in "sociological" terms, second, in terms of legal scholar-
ship's relation to non-legal disciplines, and third, in terms of 
each field's substantive characteristics. 
First, the "sociological" factors. It seems likely that, ceteris 
paribus, the longer a field has existed in a recognizable form, the 
better it will be defined and rationalized. Family law is unex-
pectedly new and thus differs from several of the maturer fields 
in the length of time society has thought about the problems for 
law each presents. There was relatively little family law in Eng-
land, and it was administered for some time by the ecclesiastical 
courts; family law in the United States was almost wholly rewrit-
ten in the nineteenth century;20 and modern family law differs 
dramatically not only from that of the nineteenth century, but 
from that of the 1950's. 
It also seems likely that the intensity with which a field has 
been thought about affects its maturity, and family law differs 
from the maturer fields in the intensity with which each has 
been thought about in legal terms. Some fields-first amend-
ment law, antitrust-win attention by their inescapable public 
importance. Everyone acknowledges the family's importance to 
society, but the relationship between family law and the family's 
social strength is complex and obscure enough to have damp-
ened public interest in family law. Some fields-torts, contracts, 
antitrust, tax-command study because of their pecuniary im-
19. The treatise seems better suited to definition, generalization, and theory, and has 
sometimes produced them. 
20. For example, the laws of husband and wife and parent and child were not even 
thought of as a unit until the latter part of the nineteenth century. Teitelbaum, Family 
History and Family Law (forthcoming). See generally M. GROSSBERG, LAW AND THE FAM-
ILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985). 
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portance to clients who can support a lucrative specialized bar. 
Although the problems of well-to-do clients have influenced 
parts of family law (marital contracts, marital property, ali-
mony), such problems have neither dominated the concerns of 
major law firms nor reached systematically throughout family 
law, and the family-law bar has historically not been distin-
guished for its intellectual contributions to its field. Finally, the 
intensity, or at least sophistication, of thought about a field in-
creases when it attracts national attention. Each of the maturer 
fields has had substantial national attention. Even torts and 
contracts have undergone prolonged national consideration in 
law schools because of their centrality in legal thought and be-
cause they are required parts of first-year curricula and in such 
fora as the American Law Institute because of their centrality in 
the law and because national uniformity in them has seemed 
useful. Family law, however, is not required in most law school 
curricula, has not seemed to need national uniformity,21 and has 
been thought specially within the responsibility, authority, and 
interest of the states. 
Family law, then, differs from maturer areas of law in its ca-
pacity to attract the well-funded, sophisticated national effort 
by which the bench and bar can work to rationalize the law.22 
The marginal standing of family law and its bar has had its cor-
relate, and in part its consequence, in the marginal standing of 
family law in academia. That marginal standing has meant that 
many able academics of the kind who might be drawn to the 
business of generalizing and theorizing have avoided the area. 28 
The second comparison between family law and maturer areas 
of law arises because each of the latter has relied for theory 
widely, though not exclusively, on a non-legal discipline. Con-
tracts, torts, antitrust, and tax have used economics;24 criminal 
law, moral philosophy; first amendment law, political philoso-
phy. Non-legal disciplines have supplied useful approaches to 
particular family-law dilemmas, and the enthusiasm greeting 
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child2" may bespeak a hunger 
for theoretically founded insights. However, family law is so var-
21. Occasional exceptions arise. Around the turn of the century, for instance, con-
servatives sought to nationalize divorce law to prevent migratory divorce and relaxed 
standards for divorce. See W. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1967). 
22. Juvenile justice, if it is a part of family law, may be an exception to this rule. 
23. Prosser, Lighthouse Na Good, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 257, 261 (1948). 
24. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 46-65. 
25. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
(1973). 
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ious that no single discipline has seemed to offer a convenient 
theoretical framework for it. Psychology has probably attracted 
the most attention, but, quite apart from doubts about psychol-
ogy's own multiplicious theoretical bases, psychology leaves 
unaddressed the crucial family-law issues spoken to by sociology, 
political science, and philosophy. The absence of a single easily 
applied non-legal theory need not be disabling, but it is deeply 
problematic: interdisciplinary work is intensely difficult when 
only two disciplines are involved; to ask for competence in more 
than two disciplines is probably to ask too much. Less globally, 
non-legal disciplines often have not developed the material fam-
ily law needs. Philosophers, for example, have said disappoint-
ingly little about the moral relationships of family members and 
between the state and families. Family sociology, otherwise a 
plausible source, has less powerful theory than might be hoped. 
Non-legal disciplines have furnished not only a theoretical 
view of how a legal field should operate; they have furnished as 
well a theory about how the people law regulates behave. Eco-
nomics, for example, supplies at least a theoretical framework 
for measuring, analyzing, and predicting behavior. This kind of 
theory is centrally important, since legal scholars stubbornly re-
sist building the empirical basis for understanding behavior rele-
vant to legal problems or for predicting how legal rules will af-
fect behavior. Once again, however, the diversity of family law's 
requirements-for theories about what people need from fami-
lies, about how people behave within families, about how abnor-
mal people normally behave, about when and how law influences 
people's behavior in families, about how bureaucracies func-
tion-means at least that no single discipline is a suitable source 
of systematic family-law theory. 
The third category of differences between family law and ma-
turer disciplines has to do with the nature of the area regulated. 
The maturer disciplines deal with what can usefully be called a 
single discrete problem or act-with the exchange of promises, 
with compensation for injuries, with restrictive trade practices, 
and so forth. Family law, though, concerns not a single problem 
or act, but a whole area of life. Family law, in other words, is 
better compared to "business regulation" than to, say, contracts. 
The relative complexity of family law may be seen in the fact 
that it is both private law and public law, in the number of basic 
relationships involved in it (husband and wife, parent and child, 
individual and state, and family and state), and in the number 
of areas of law which comprise it (contracts, torts, criminal law, 
evidence, tax, constitutional law, conflict of laws, trusts and es-
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tates, social-welfare law, and so on). Complexity at this level 
may impede the simplification inherent in generalization and 
theory. 
Furthermore, the sources of family law exacerbate the com-
plexity and unwieldiness that can obscure the path to general-
ization and theory. Most of the maturer areas of law developed 
through a "common law" method. Torts and contracts and, to 
some extent, criminal law, were actually common law subjects; 
constitutional law and antitrust law both have short, vague texts 
given meaning by judicial interpretation. Family law, on the 
other hand, relies widely on statutes whose interpretation is 
complicated by a residual common-law tradition, by constitu-
tional considerations, and by the frequent intersection of family 
law with other areas of law. No sane lawyer thinks judge-made 
law is always coherent; but coherence is, for familiar reasons, a 
goal of case law in ways that it need not be of statutes. The 
complexity of family law is increased, of course, by the wonder-
ful multiplicity of groups which seek to affect it, and by the ra-
pidity with which the family and beliefs about it change. Com-
plexity need not, of course, prevent us from generalizing and 
theorizing-indeed complexity may make it specially desirable 
to reduce family law to comprehensible and manageable terms. 
But complexity does make the path to generalization and theory 
perplexingly difficult. 
A coherent normative view of the internal workings and exter-
nal relations of families might afford a basis for theories about 
family law. In the nineteenth century a patriarchal-Christian 
view of the family perhaps did give family law some coherence.26 
But since family law deals with "the less than rational, the his-
torically conditioned, fiercely individual, imaginative, parochial, 
the less than fully articulate," side of morality,27 and since our 
cultural consensus about family morals long ago collapsed, and 
pluralism has become one of the Constitution's "values," a co-
herent normative view of the family now seems an unpromising 
source of inspiration for family-law scholars. 
Finally, family law itself is historically contingent: it has re-
sponded to the flow of social change and to our fluid, even fad-
dish, views of family life; it has been conditioned by the fierce 
enforcement problems which characterize family law. For these 
reasons, and because of our strong normative preference for 
26. Schneider, Moral Discourse in American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 
(1985). 
27. S. HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT 2 (1983). 
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family autonomy, family law does not regulate family life sys-
tematically, but treats it only intermittently. It is hard to pro-
duce a systematic view of an unsystematic subject, and perhaps 
family law must always be ad hoc, responsive to local conditions, 
sensitive to the day's sensibilities, and willing to compromise ir-
reconcilable differences. 28 
III. 
Much that I have said suggests that family law will not soon 
reach full maturity as a field of scholarship. The difficulties of 
borrowing theory from non-legal disciplines persist, as do the 
impediments to theory presented by the nature of family law it-
self. Nevertheless, many of the obstacles to the field's maturity 
are lessening. Professor Ackerman argues that American law 
generally is moving into a less particularistic period, one in 
which lawyers will require "the systematic test of particular ac-
tivist interventions by legal principles that seek to capture the 
basic ideals that have led the American people to embrace activ-
ism .... "29 It is at any rate difficult for one area of law to be 
unaffected by developments common in other areas, and family 
law can hardly be unaffected by the lively maturity of many 
other areas of law. The popularity of interdisciplinary work will 
likewise be hard to resist, and because the social sciences live to 
theorize, their influence should promote generalization and the-
ory. Furthermore, the work of traditional scholarship has laid a 
foundation of detailed, concrete analysis and doctrine which can 
help us escape the dangers of a priori definition and theory.30 
The greatest changes, however, may be "sociological." Family 
law is less marginal than before. The consensus undergirding 
many family laws has dissolved, and both liberals and conserva-
tives find family-law issues pressing. The women's movement 
has raised old issues to new prominence and has produced fresh 
28. Cf. G. WHITE, supra note 2, at 240: 
Conceptualism, as a mode of thought, is impatient with an ad hoc treatment of 
legal issues, with competing theories of liability, and with multiple purposes for 
an area of law. I think, however, that tort law more closely resembles a shifting 
mass of diverse wrongs than a tidy, conceptually unified subject. Multiple pur-
poses for tort law, multiple standards of tort liability, and individualized deter-
minations of tort claims reflect the innate character of the field. 
29. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 20. 
30. Cf. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV. 37 (1954); 
Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx. L. REV. 35 
(1981). 
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ones, and resurgent fundamentalism has responded in kind. As 
controversy over family laws has intensified, combatants have 
sought out social theory to inform and deepen their arguments. 
The consequent addition of so many intriguing and intractable 
social issues to the family-law curriculum has enriched the field, 
and the pace and scope of change have enlivened it. Family law 
is becoming constitutionalized31 and nationalized,32 develop-
ments which augured well for another field Dean Prosser said no 
one wanted to teach-criminal procedure. Constitutionalization 
not only has "sociological" consequences that reduce the mar-
ginality of family law; it also promotes generalization and theory 
because it compels us to survey the field to see which elements 
are altered by new doctrine and to review family-law problems 
in terms of basic values. 
Family-law scholarship, then, is well-situated to begin the 
work of generalization and theory. There is also a sense in which 
we cannot genuinely escape them. As Professor Kuhn writes of 
scientific progress, "No natural history can be interpreted in the 
absence of at least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical 
and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and 
criticism."33 Presumably, family law already has, at some level, 
theories that direct our understanding of it. But because those 
theories are unexamined, they are insufficiently exact, insuffi-
ciently general, insufficiently coherent, and perhaps quite mis-
taken. The question, then, is whether we will give ourselves the 
benefit of identifying, articulating, and scrutinizing our theoreti-
cal and methodological beliefs, our organizing assumptions. 
Making assumptions explicit has benefits too well-known to 
merit prolonged elaboration; it exposes and makes available our 
first principles, it deepens our understanding and expands our 
ability to rationalize it. But there are special reasons such an 
enterprise might benefit the substance and scholarship of family 
law. First, family law concerns people's most powerful and least 
rational feelings, yet it is perhaps the area of law in which deci-
sions are least often guided by clear standards. Examining and 
rationalizing assumptions is a conventional solution to this kind 
of problem. Second, family law deals with an area of social 
thought specially prone to facile change and, as the proponents 
31. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (procedural due pro-
cess); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (equal protection); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (substantive due process). 
32. For example, family lawyers and legal academics have collaborated on the UNI-
FORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (1970) and the Juvenile Justice Standards Project. 
33. T. KUHN, supra note 15, at 16-17. 
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of "family policy" argue, specially prone to treat its problems 
inconsistently. Family law therefore peculiarly needs the kind of 
resistance to superficiality and to ill-considered change which 
examined assumptions can give. 34 Third, family law scholarship 
repeatedly over-examines some problems and ignores others. Ex-
plicit assumptions, combined with a clear view of the whole 
field, can help direct scholarship, and can make it easier for one 
scholar to build on the work of others. 
The benefits of defining our field are similarly attractive. The 
dimensions of few legal fields are so uncertain. Twenty years 
ago, defining the field as "the law of domestic relations" had 
much appeal, but even then there were, as there remain, ques-
tions as to why other law which affects the family-tax law, so-
cial-welfare legislation, law directly regulating the behavior of 
children, and so forth-ought not be studied with the law of 
marriage, divorce, and child custody. The social and legal change 
of the last two decades expands the field beyond the law of do-
mestic relations: consider, as one instance among many, the ef-
fect on the definition of family law of our present uncertainty 
about the definition of "family" itself, an uncertainty expressed 
in the law by cases blurring the distinction between married and 
unmarried couples, 35 by doubts about the familial status of ho-
mosexual couples,36 by cases dealing with attempts to expand 
the range of parent-child relations,37 by cases dealing with argu-
34. However, the arguments for articulate rationalization of law may apply better to 
family law's scholarship than to its substance. Scholarship is by its nature committed to 
understanding fully how the world works; the genius of American politics is often 
thought to be its ability to compromise and muddle over differences in principle in order 
to allow the world to work. National division on well-developed ideological lines can, as 
the politics of abortion may demonstrate, poison political life, put religious liberty at 
risk, taint toleration, and seem to justify violent resolution of political differences. See 
Schneider, A Response to Two Puzzles (forthcoming). 
35. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (an-
nouncing that contracts-express or implied-between unmarried couples would be en-
forced to the extent the contract was not based on meretricious consideration). 
36. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971) (affirming a refusal to 
issue a marriage license to a homosexual couple), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); 
In re Adult Anonymous II, 88 A.D.2d 30, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1982) (holding that one 
homosexual adult male could adopt an older one); In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 
N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984) (holding that New York adoption 
statute does not authorize such adoptions). 
37. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 
(1977) (acknowledging, but not reaching, the question whether foster parents can acquire 
a constitutionally-protected interest in their relations with foster children); Syrkowski v. 
Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983) (finding no jurisdiction to address 
questions raised by a "surrogate mother" arrangement), rev'd, 420 Mich. 367, 362 
N.W.2d 211 (1985). See also Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.) (re-
jecting adoptee's claim of a constitutional right to learn the name of his natural mother 
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men ts for narrowing the parent-child relationship, 38 and by 
cases raising the question of the legal definition of the extended 
family. 39 
Public anxiety about the family has, through proposals for 
"family policy," brought the definition of "family law" before 
the general public: The Carnegie Council on Children proposes 
"the nation develop a family policy as comprehensive as its de-
fense policy,""0 and as a candidate, Jimmy Carter could find "no 
more urgent priority for the next administration than to see that 
every decision our government makes is designed to honor and 
support and strengthen the American family.""1 Proponents of 
"family policy" argue expressly that government injures the 
family when it acts without considering all laws affecting the 
family. Thus, defining family law raises basic questions about 
family law's purpose substantively and as a field of scholarship. 
Substantively, for example, should family law merely provide 
the legal mechanisms minimally required to allow people to or-
der their private lives, or should it try systematically to bulwark 
a social institution called the family? As scholars, are we, for 
example, trying to understand how . a particular kind of 
law-family law-affects families, how governmental action as a 
whole affects families, or how governmental action affects people 
in particular aspects of their (more or less) private lives? 
from a government agency), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). But see, e.g., MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 710.27 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (statute providing access to some such 
information). 
38. Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 511, 516 P.2d 840, 854, 111 Cal. Rptr. 
136, 150 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting) (arguing that adult children cannot be required 
to support their indigent parents, because they are situated vis-a-vis their parents simi-
larly to any other member of society); Israel v. Allen, 195 Colo. 263, 577 P.2d 762 (1978) 
(holding that siblings by adoption who had not lived simultaneously in their adopted 
parents' household were not prevented from marrying by an incest statute prohibiting 
the marriage of siblings by adoption); Pamela P. v. Frank S., 110 Misc. 2d 978, 443 
N.Y.S.2d 343 (1981) (holding that a man deceived by a woman's misrepresentation that 
she was using birth control could not constitutionally be ordered to pay child support if 
the woman could afford to support the child), aff'd in part, reu'd in part, 88 A.D.2d 865, 
451 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1982), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 1,449 N.E.2d 713,462 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1983); see 
also Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L. 
REV. 1614 (1982). 
39. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a 
zoning ordinance defining "family" so as to prevent a grandmother from living with 
grandchildren by two different children); Sparks v. Wigglesworth, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 
3173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that grandparents could obtain rights to visit the child 
of their divorced son, where the child was in the custody of his mother). 
40. K. KENNISTON & THE CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON CHILDREN, ALL OUR CHILDREN: THE 
AMERICAN FAMILY UNDER PRESSURE 76 (1977). 
41. Quoted in G. STEINER, THE FUTILITY OF FAMILY POLICY 14 (1981). 
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As the preceding paragraph implies, one of legal scholarship's 
standard problems has peculiar acuteness in family law: what is 
the special province of legal scholarship? Is that scholarship lim-
ited to studying "legal" institutions as distinct from "govern-
mental" institutions? To what extent can it usefully formulate 
substantive standards for legal decisions? Applying these general 
questions to family law, we may ask, for instance, whether it 
should investigate only the acts of legislatures and courts, or to 
what extent it should also investigate the behavior of executive 
agencies as well. Executive agencies of course make and apply 
family law, but their study is already the province of political 
science and social work. Or, we may ask whether family law 
should formulate substantive standards that give meaning to the 
empty standards-like "the best interest of the child"-usual in 
family law. Elaborating broad standards is a classically legal un-
dertaking, yet elaborating the "best interest" standard invades 
claims staked out by psychology and sociology. 
Professor Fried suggests that what lawyers distinctively do is 
to apply" 'the artificial Reason' of the law,"42 to use analogy and 
precedent to fill out the broad structure of the law. But, by this 
test, family law is in major particulars hardly law at all: In its 
public law aspects, family law's scope often goes beyond "law" to 
"social policy." No doubt all law is social policy, but not all so-
cial policy is aptly, or even well, studied by lawyers. While they 
may have helpful things to say about, for example, the proce-
dures by which foster care of children is begun and ended, they 
are rarely competent to assess the effects of foster care on chil-
dren. Even less are they competent to deal with questions of 
how to construct a social welfare program that will combat the 
effects of poverty in the short run and end it in the long run. In 
its private law aspects, family law deliberately confides to the 
discretion of a judge (often a specialized judge thought to be ex-
pert in family problems) decisions guided by standards which 
are intentionally vague ("in the best interests of the child," "eq-
uitably apportion," or "in amounts and for periods of time the 
court deems just"). Not only are these standards vague, they 
often are not construed, amplified, and sharpened through a 
body of precedent. All this means that the family law scholar 
suffers with special discomfort uncertainty about the relation-
ship between law and its related disciplines. 43 
42. Fried, supra note 30, at 39 (quoting Coke). 
43. For example, although many jurisdictions have refined precedent on a few narrow 
questions about child custody (e.g., whether a parent living unmarried with a new "com-
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In sum, I have suggested in this part of the essay that social 
change, our awareness of the interconnectedness of things, our 
growing ambitions for social programs, and our changing defini-
tions of "family" combine to cast doubt on the proper range of 
government interest in the family and thus upon the proper 
range of family-law scholarship. Furthermore, the same factors 
threaten to extend the range of factors relevant to family law 
well beyond any conventional range of legal scholarship and well 
beyond the ordinary capacity of legal scholars. Finally, this part 
of the essay reflects with particular clarity the interrelationship 
between definition and synthesis in family law. The uncertain-
ties I have described will be best resolved when consideration of 
them is informed by some theoretical understanding of family 
law; yet such an understanding must itself rest on some defini-
tional understandings of family law's function and ours. 
IV. 
Accepting arguendo that the time is at least riper for general-
ization and theory and that they offer rewards worth winning, 
what courses might family law next take? Let me now be more 
precise. I do not at all wish to eliminate inquiries into narrow 
topics; the difficulty lies not in the presence of narrow topics, 
but in the absence of broad ones. I do not at all wish to elimi-
nate doctrinal work; rather, I want doctrinal work to have the 
power gained by breadth, perspective, and clarity. I do not at all 
believe that generalization and theory have any necessary rela-
tion to consensus or even agreement; rather, they can help us 
define our differences more clearly and defend them more 
profoundly. 
I believe we should remember the dangers of generalization 
and theory: both encourage too sanguine a belief in the possibil-
ity of simplicity and coherence, and thus both encourage Pro-
crustean thought; both can lead to the useless, the vacuous, the 
banal formulae-"equal concern and respect," for in-
stance-which too conveniently characterize theory.•• I think we 
should remember the limitations of the social sciences and the 
panion" can have custody), most child custody decisions are likely to be made under the 
"best interest" standard simpliciter. 
44. Cf. Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1174, 1178-79 (1979) (reviewing L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1978)). For a perceptive discussion of the com-
plexity of doctrinal simplicity, see Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York 
v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285. 
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inherent difficulties of interdisciplinary work. I think we must 
remember that many of the impediments to generalization and 
theory I described above remain. Thus I doubt that we should 
expect convincing comprehensive theory to emerge quickly; I 
will be content if we begin to develop the kinds of generaliza-
tions which may eventually form the basis for theory. But even 
if family law proves resistant to any useful sort of theory, I be-
lieve the search for syntheses itself should, as a side effect, yield 
helpful insights into narrower topics. 
There is an inherent difficulty in urging definition, generaliza-
tion, and theory. The difficulties of those three enterprises are 
obvious and demonstrated. Their possible disadvantages may 
also be convincingly shown. But their advantages can be proved 
only by fully developing particular definitions, generalizations, 
and theories. That, of course, exceeds the scope of this essay. 
Nevertheless, I close with some examples of generalizations that 
may open broader and more stimulating visions of our subject. I 
begin with the conventional suggestion that perspective on the 
present is gained by knowledge of the past. Despite a surge of 
illuminating writing in social history, the history of family law 
has hardly been begun;u Yet historical study is particularly use-
ful, I think, to family law, since assumptions (often ill-founded) 
about both the Edenic past of families and the extent to which 
the family has changed over time figure repeatedly in family-law 
discourse. 46 
Our study of history might also reveal current trends in family 
law. Given law's reliance on precedent and analogy, trends can 
work more powerfully in law than in many areas of life, and they 
therefore should reward study. For instance, contractarianism, 
once central to American family law, is again gaining strength. 
The scope of pre-nuptial contracts is expanding, the permissibil-
ity of extra-marital contracts is increasing, contractual solutions 
to custody and property disputes on divorce are urged, contracts 
dictating the terms of marital life are praised, the very word 
"status" reeks in modern nostrils. A broad and sophisticated 
study of this trend could be most illuminating. It is, after all, a 
45. There are signs of interest, however. The University of Wisconsin's History De-
partment and Law School and the National Endowment for the Humanities are sponsor-
ing a series of conferences on the history of family law, Professor Michael Grossberg will 
publish this year a survey of nineteenth-century family law, and there has been some 
historical work on divorce and child custody, and quite a bit on juvenile courts. 
46. Cf. E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1977); L. STONE, FAMILY, 
SEX, AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800 (1977); T. CAPLOW, MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES 
(1982). 
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trend rich in ironies. On one hand, contracts are advocated be-
cause they give the parties greater control of the terms of their 
association. On the other hand, contracts are welcomed because 
they let courts prevent parties from reaching inequitable terms 
of agreement, and perhaps even let courts impose equitable 
terms. Contractarian enthusiasm comes when contracts scholars 
talk of the death of contracts, and when it has become common 
wisdom to acknowledge the distance between what contract law 
says and what contracting parties do.47 It comes too when some 
forms of contractarian thought in family law-breach of prom-
ise, alienation of affections-have lost their luster. What limits 
on family law contracts might those ironies portend? What con-
tracts, if any, are against public policy? Contracts with respect 
to child support? To surrogate mothers? To abortion? What im-
plied contracts, if any should be enforced? To what extent 
should people be pressured, or compelled, to contract about the 
terms of their relationships? To what extent is contractarian 
thought-arm's length bargaining, anticipation of conflict, 
countenancing of breaches, enumeration of rights and reme-
dies-inimical to successful (or desirable) personal relations? 
What does the popularity of contractarian thought tell us about 
the forces molding family law? About what family law ought to 
seek to achieve? About what family law can achieve? About 
what family life is and ought to be? 
Another conventional source of perspective is cross-cultural 
work. It is no accident that comparativists have gone further 
than most of us toward generalization and theory,48 for good 
comparative work looks for systematic areas of difference and 
similarity between bodies of family law and tries to explain them 
systematically. Comparative work can provide Brandeisian labo-
ratories for testing approaches to family law problems,49 it can 
identify ways in which particular social factors-a country's reli-
gion, its feudal past, its revolutionary present-shape its family 
laws, and it can identify large social and economic 
forces-urbanization and industrialization are classic exam-
ples-that have affected every Western country's family laws. 00 
47. Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
Soc. REV. 55 (1963); White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial Transactions: An Ar-
tifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1982). 
48. E.g., M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); see also Mar-
kovits, Socialist u. Bourgeois Rights-An East-West German Comparison, 45 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 612 (1978). 
49. For a provocative example, see G. STEINER, supra note 41. 
50. See M. GLENDON, supra note 48. 
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Useful generalizations about family law can be drawn by iden-
tifying and investigating frequently recurring issues. For in-
stance, family law's difficulty enforcing its rules is virtually ubiq-
uitous: Consider the problems society has experienced enforcing 
alimony orders, spouse- and child-support obligations, strict di-
vorce statutes, spouse- and child-abuse laws, visitation rights, 
sodomy and fornication statutes, and prohibitions of abortion, 
contraception, and parental kidnapping. What produces the en-
forcement difficulty? The fact that the prohibited activities are 
hard to discover? That people feel the activities are not im-
proper? That people feel the activities are not the law's busi-
ness? That the laws are enforced laxly? That the penalties are 
mild? That the law is not supported by other social institutions? 
That people operate within families under emotional influences 
they cannot easily control? What kinds of measures can solve 
the enforcement difficulty, if any? What kinds of costs would 
those measures impose? Is the enforcement problem genuinely 
more severe in family law than elsewhere? Do we derive any 
benefits from laws that cannot be, or simply are not, well en-
forced? Do such laws retain some moral influence, or are they 
simply tools best suited for abuse? An issue like the enforcement 
problem can, of course, be reached through the study of specific 
doctrinal issues.111 But it commonly is not reached because (in 
part) our piecemeal approach obscures the centrality and com-
plexity of the enforcement problem. Looking at the enforcement 
problem across its whole range can also direct us to specific ar-
eas suitable for investigating hypotheses about the enforcement 
problem and may lead us to further questions worth studying. It 
surely should make inescapably plain the need for empirical re-
search into family-law problems.112 
Another recurrent theme in family law has to do with how de-
cisions are made. This theme, like the enforcement problem, ap-
proaches ubiquity, for family law raises questions not only about 
51. See, for example, D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979), and yet more ex-
plicitly, Lempert, Organizing for Deterrence: Lessons From a Study of Child Support, 
16 LAW & Soc'v REv. 513 (1982). 
52. Cf. Kuhn's observation about research in immature sciences: 
In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts 
that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to 
seem equally relevant. As a result, early fact-gathering is a far more nearly ran-
dom activity than the one that subsequent scientific development makes famil-
iar. Furthermore, in the absence of a reason for seeking some particular form of 
more recondite information, early fact-gathering is usually restricted to the 
wealth of data that lie ready to hand. 
T. KuHN, supra note 15, at 15. 
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how legal actors do, can, and should make decisions, but about 
how families and family members make decisions. Family law 
does not involve itself in many kinds of family affairs, for exam-
ple, partly because the law doubts it can make decisions about 
families as well as the families can. These doubts shape doctrine: 
estimations of parents' ability to make decisions for their chil-
dren speak to questions of procedural due process,63 and estima-
tions of young girls' ability to make decisions about abortions 
affect questions of substantive due process.64 Doubts about insti-
tutional capacity to make decisions similarly lie at the base of 
due process doctrine. The task of much family law-particularly 
that involving children-is to set the terms under which bureau-
crats deal with citizens. Do due process limitations genuinely 
improve the quality of decisions? Do they do so in family law 
cases, where speed may be important and where many decisions 
are confided to experts? How are decisions made (by judges or 
bureaucrats) when standards are vague? Do decision-makers de-
velop rules of thumb? Do improper considerations enter in? 
What are the costs of preventing improper ·considerations from 
entering in? Are the costs too great? Is it true in family law, as 
we assume it to be elsewhere in the law, that a good decision is 
one that can be, and has been, justified exclusively in logical 
terms? 
A variation of this approach to generalization is to look at the 
over-arching "values" of family law. Pluralism, for instance, is 
called such a value. However, at some level pluralism is ulti-
mately inconsistent with the regulation of society. What is that 
level? Is pluralism in fact over-arching? Because of its social im~ 
portance? Because of its moral desirability? Does it regularly 
conflict with other possible over-arching values of family law, 
like individual autonomy and community cohesion? If so, can we 
devise principles for resolving conflicts between pluralism and 
those other values? What kinds of issues are appropriate for plu-
ralistic resolution? 
Still another approach to generalization lies in direct attempts 
to identify the assumptions underlying family law. For example, 
what views of human nature inform family law? This is surely a 
question of the utmost interest and importance. A family law 
that fears that people are naturally depraved must differ from 
one that hopes they are naturally virtuous. Yet this fascinating 
and crucial question seems never to have been addressed. How 
53. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
54. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
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have changing views of human nature shaped family law? Is 
post-Freudian family law different from pre-Freudian family 
law? Much of the constitutional doctrine of privacy and its at-
tendant scholarship rests on facile assumptions about what is 
necessary for human dignity and happiness. What are those as-
sumptions? Do we actually believe them? Is belief in them class-
bound? Are they correct? If so, are family laws consistent with 
them? How much freedom in personal affairs do people need? 
How much do they want? How much should they have? 
Another intriguing set of assumptions to investigate could be 
reached by asking what views of morality inform family law. I 
have argued at length elsewhere that in recent years family law 
has been transformed by an attempt to remove moral language 
from its discourse and to transfer responsibility for moral 
thought to those it once regulated. 55 To what extent can the law 
achieve moral neutrality? To what extent should it try to? To 
what extent does moral neutrality impede society in its tasks of 
socializing its young and enforcing its basic norms? (Even people 
committed to "neutral" family law argue for the deterrent and 
educative benefits of automatic criminal prosecutions of spouse 
abusers.) Any society must give its members a sense of stability 
and mutual concern. Is some commonality of belief about the 
central moral issues family law poses necessary to that sense? 
Can a liberal, secular, pluralist, individualist society be a moral 
community? Can a society prosper which is not a moral commu-
nity? Assuming they are necessary, what kinds of moral views 
ought to inform family law, and what kinds of moral arguments 
are legitimate in legal analysis? Must a moral belief be suscepti-
ble of rational, utilitarian justification? Is it enough that a moral 
belief is deeply rooted in our national heritage? That it is ar-
dently believed by most people? 
We need, finally, to discuss directly the purposes of family 
law. What do we hope to accomplish through it? What func-
tions-intended and unintended-does family law serve? To 
what extent should we try to use family law to change the way 
people behave in families? To change the way people behave 
generally? To change what people believe? Ought family law 
limit itself to trying to prevent harm, or can it try to do good? 
55. Schneider, supra note 26. 
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V. 
I close with one more, brief, suggestion. We live in an age of 
introspection, an age of diaries and autobiographies, an age in 
which self-examination has under the banner of psychoanalysis 
been elevated to the prestige of a science and the dignity of a 
philosophy. It is an age in which many scholarly disciplines have 
found uses in self-examination. Historians have their historiog-
raphy, scientists have their philosophers, and scholars of the law 
may benefit from their example. Interest in the history and 
methods of legal scholarship has of course always existed and 
has sometimes flourished, but-at least in its published form-it 
has been sporadic and ad hoc. In family law, such reflection has 
hardly existed. If we are to achieve the kind of maturity which I 
have been urging, I suspect reflection will be persistently neces-
sary. And such reflection may help lead us to the far far better 
family law that must be our goal. 

